Eurosceptic politics and European integration
This is a approx. 3000 word essay I wrote on the impact that Eurosceptic political parties are having on European integration. Recently I have done further reading on Eurosceptic/Populist movements including works by Cas Mudde and Matthew Goodwin, so it is a topic that I would like to revisit and perhaps redo with new sources. Anyway…
What is the impact of Eurosceptic politics on European Integration?
The recent years have seen a rapid rise in the popularity of Eurosceptic political parties (Adler, 2019) throughout Europe. At the same time there has been an increase in European integration at a European Union level (Wiener & Diez, 2012). There are examples of where Euroscepticism has had an impact on attempts to increase European integration; such as in Scandinavia, where in both Denmark and Norway there was decisive rejection of increased integration at referendums (Sitter, 2001) which arguably was the result of efforts by Eurosceptic political movements. Another more recent case would be Brexit, where the United Kingdom held a referendum which resulted in a victory for the campaigns to leave the European Union (Electoral Commission, 2016). This vote was widely seen as a rejection of European integration and brought up many of the issues discussed by Eurosceptic political movements such as national sovereignty and democratic accountability. These issues are perceived by Eurosceptics to be under threat from increased European integration. This essay will look at several European countries and discuss how local Eurosceptic parties have presented their opposition to European integration, therefore analysing the impact of Eurosceptic politics on European integration.
Germany is widely seen as being essential to the European project and is perceived as a leader within the European Union, often taking an important role as the foremost advocate of European integration (Bulmer & Paterson, 1996). European integration is an area that within German party politics has generally been one of consensus, the topic of is one which is rarely discussed during national election campaigns (Kriesi, 2007). Kriesi noted that Germany lacked a “conservative or new populist right party mobilizing against Europe” and that the leading German conservative party, the CDU, has always been strongly pro-European despite moving to a stronger opposition to immigration. Recent years have seen this change, with the rise of the Alternative for Germany (AFD); a nationalist-populist party that at the most recent German elections won 91 seats in the Bundestag (Deutscher Bundestag, 2017) and entering national parliament for the first time. The AFD has a strongly Eurosceptic outlook and has challenged European integration in Germany. The 2017 AFD electoral program focused upon linking European integration and migration as an issue, with their ‘short program’ also declaring “No to a United States of Europe” (Lees, 2018); this presents clear opposition to European integration. Lees (2018) argues that continued success of the AFD in German federal elections could lead to “disruption” within German politics which would hinder this. However, Hansen & Olsen (2018) argue that anti-EU sentiment is not a driving factor behind support for the AFD. Instead they say that they draw their support due to their anti-immigration and anti-establishment message. Arzheimer (2015) argues that in the long run however, continued success of the AFD could directly or indirectly effect European integration policies. He argues that “AfD’s success is already fuelling an internal backlash from conservatives against Merkel’s socially liberal policies.”. It can be argued then that the continued success of the AFD could lead to the CDU adopting a more Eurosceptic position in an attempt to win back voters that have moved to the AFD which, as it is likely that the CDU will be part of the governing coalition of Germany for the foreseeable future, could see a reduction in European integration.
Die Linke sits on the opposite end of the traditional political spectrum and does have large Eurosceptic elements within it. Hansen & Olsen (2018) observe that European integration is an issue amongst their voter base. Die Linke does hold strong Eurosceptic positions such as an opposition to the Euro, which they argue has caused further division between European countries (Leruth, Startin, & Usherwood, 2018). However, their position could better be described as one of soft Euroscepticism, displayed by their continued commitment to the ideal of a united Europe but that they see the current EU as being too neo-liberal (Leruth, Startin, & Usherwood, 2018). Ultimately, Die Linke possesses a belief that many issues in Europe can only be solved at a supranational level and thereby does not argue for a German exit of the European Union (Charalambous, 2011). In terms of their impact on European integration, Die Linke lack major electoral success and so rarely have a chance to impact German policy. Similarly, in the European Parliament, they are part of the Party of the European Left which only holds 28 seats in the European parliament at this time and has no representatives on the European Council. Overall, Eurosceptic politics have had little effect on European integration within Germany. This can be partially attributed to the fact that Eurosceptic parties have failed to achieve large electoral success until recent years, and when they have, such as they AFD did in 2017, they have been isolated from political discussions by the other political parties and therefore have not had the chance to influence German policy on European integration . Moreover, Die Linke has large Eurosceptic elements within it, but still recognises Germany’s strong established position within the European Union. Therefore, they are still inclined to support the European idea, albeit with the policy of significant reforms within the European Union.
Italy is an example of a country where Eurosceptic parties have now entered the political mainstream. The Italian government formed after the 2018 Italian general election was unlike any that had come to power in recent years, with the Five Star Movement (M5S) and The League (Lega) forming a government coalition, receiving assistance from some other smaller regional parties (Huffington Post, 2018). Both M5S and Lega are both considered Eurosceptic and their period in government, which lasted until September the 5th of this year (Rubino & Buzzanca, 2019) saw much opposition to European integration. M5S can be viewed as having a soft Eurosceptic perspective, with their views being more nuanced, as they are critical of “specific policies of European integration” and often oppose the EU on economic issues such as employment, austerity and stability (Leruth, Startin, & Usherwood, 2018) without also using an anti-migrant or nationalistic outlook. To this end they also opposed the Euro (Leruth, Startin, & Usherwood, 2018) which was a policy they ultimately dropped (Telegraph, 2018) in order to attract more support for the party. Therefore, this arguably demonstrates that Eurosceptic parties often must moderate their stance on European integration in order to achieve electoral success. It has been argued that the M5S has displayed a contradictory position on Europe at times, the founder of M5S Beppe Grillo has expressed his support for the founders of the forerunner organisations to the EU (Franzosi, Marone, & Salvati, 2015), this sharply contrasts with the anti-EU positioning mentioned as previously. The MS5’s opposition to European integration appears to be driven less by nationalism and worries about the erosion of sovereignty. Instead their soft Euroscepticism stems from the anti-establishment rhetoric of the party and their opposition to liberal free market system that the EU has in place, through mechanisms such as the EFTA. This has been demonstrated within their European Parliament voting record, which can be contrasted with other Eurosceptic parties. M5S only voted with their European Parliament Group, Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy, 41.45% of the time and in fact often voted with the governing parties of the European Parliament, 58 times with S&D and ALDE and 55 times with the EPP (Franzosi, Marone, & Salvati, 2015).
The the other largest Italian Eurosceptic party is Lega, formally known as Lega Nord. Lega are led by former Italian deputy Prime Minister Matteo Salvini. As mentioned previously, they formed a coalition government with M5S, governing Italy for around one year. The party had been previously pro-Europe when it had more of a regionalist focus, demanding independence for northern Italy, but in 1998 switched to Euroscepticism which could be seen due to Italy’s entry into the Euro during this period. It has even noted that “The Lega’s eurosceptic stance has been anything but consistent, as indicated by the party’s record with regard to European Treaty ratification: it abstained on the ratification of the Treaty of Amsterdam, voted for the Treaty of Nice, against the European Constitution and for the Treaty of Lisbon.” (Verney, 2011). It can be argued then that this shows that Eurosceptic parties are often opposed to parts of European integration, while often supporting aspects of it which favour their policies or political outlook. Therefore, depending on the popularity of the movement, they could have a large impact on European integration. The Italian government’s reaction to European integration while it was run by the coalition between M5S and Lega is varied. In his position as deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior, Matteo Salvini was a frequently outspoken critic of the EU and European integration quoted as saying “Today for many citizens and peoples, the European Union represents a nightmare,” (News Wires, 2019) and has said Lega’s manifesto “underline[s] and reaffirm[s]comm… the supremacy of the Italian constitution over European laws and directives” (Walker, Giuffrida, & Henley, 2019). Positions of power can be seen to legitimise the cause of Eurosceptics, and in the case of Italy, has allowed for Eurosceptics to use their increased power and influence to; organise and co-ordinate European Eurosceptics (Matamoros, 2019), block attempts to increase European integration and pursue more policies independent of the EU which may even contradict current European policy (BBC News, 2019).Therefore positions of power have increased the impact that Eurosceptic politics can have on European integration. In conclusion, Eurosceptic politics has had a large impact on European integration within Italy, albeit this is a very recent phenomenon. The previous Italian governments, like those lead by Silvio Berlusconi, did display some minor soft Euroscepticism. But with the rapid increase in popularity of Eurosceptic parties leading to them becoming the largest parties, their anti-establishment approach has brought a harder Euroscepticism to Italian politics. This is based of the fact that European integration is opposed in two senses in Italy. The M5S opposes Europe on largely economic and so-called democratic grounds, citing a democratic deficit coupled with a lack of accountability and opposition to the liberal-free market economic policies that European integration brings. Lega’s Euroscepticism has also focused on an opposition to European integration on grounds of national sovereignty. But in while government their opposition to European integration was mainly focused around issues of immigration and asylum, where the EU has ultimately conceded ground to them, leading to less European integration.
The United Kingdom is perhaps the clearest example of where Eurosceptic politics have had an impact on European integration. The two major British political parties, the Conservative party and the Labour party, have ebbed and flowed between supporting or opposing European integration (Forster, 2002). More recently there has been the emergence of avowedly Eurosceptic parties in the UK that have then gained popular traction, specifically the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) and the Brexit Party. Former Chancellor and Minister of Foreign affairs Geoffrey Howe argued that the divisions within the Labour and Conservative Parties prohibited a proper UK-wide discussion on the issue (Howe & Tory Reform Group, 1994). The current position of the Conservative party has moved arguably to the right, and they now can be seen to have more in common with the national-populist parties such as those part of the Identity and Democracy group, demonstrated by their “unilateralist rejectionism” of European integration (Leruth, Startin, & Usherwood, 2018). As the Conservative party have been the sole government party of the United Kingdom since 2015, this has been made clear in their attitude towards European integration. Comparison can be made between the deals agreed by former Prime Minister Theresa May and current Prime Minister Boris Johnson. May’s deal laid the groundwork for Britain to remain in the single market and as part of the customs union. Whereas Johnsons deal specifically focuses upon the UK having it’s own customs union (Usherwood, 2019) which gives a clear example of how the new increased Eurosceptic direction of the Conservative party could impact future European integration. The impact of Conservative Eurosceptic politics has been seen previously, such as in the 1990s under the Premiership of John Major, where large splits emerged within the party following Britain’s signing of the treaty of Maastricht (Forster, 2002). Further impact of this Euroscepticism on efforts of European integration can be observed in the Conservative’s ‘Save the Pound’ campaign that had been launched in the run up to the 2001 general election. Albeit considered a failure, it arguably set the precedent for the populist nationalism that would become there the centre of the Eurosceptic campaign it (Leruth, Startin, & Usherwood, 2018).
Perhaps the most prominent example of the recent surge of Eurosceptic political parties which have had a large impact on European integration is UKIP. The party started as a largely single issue party and was the only party for a substantial period which called for the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union, and arguably played a key role in facilitating the EU referendum (Usherwood, 2016) that has lead to Brexit. Therefore, it could be argued that UKIP have had one of the largest impacts of any Eurosceptic political party on European integration as they helped to bring about one of the potential largest reversals of integration in the history of Europe. Like movements such as AFD and Lega it’s opposition to integration draws on the idea of national sovereignty being undermined coupled with a strong emphasis on anti-immigration (Taggart, 2017). One argument related to Brexit is that the campaigns for Britain to leave the European union is that they depicted the UK as a victim of European integration and that people were now less well off as a result of it (Leruth, Startin, & Usherwood, 2018). This narrative arguably was very common throughout the referendum debate, pushed by Eurosceptic political parties. However, UKIP has lost relevance as a political force within the United Kingdom and has largely been replaced by the Brexit Party. They are led by former three-time UKIP leader Nigel Farage and are largely a single-issue party focused upon Brexit (PoliticsHome.com, 2019). The Brexit Party became the largest UK party in the European Parliament at the most recent European elections (Adler, 2019) and has used its position along with the other national-populist parties which achieved success at these elections to push for less European integration. This demonstrates further that the impact of Eurosceptic politics on European integration is dependant on electoral success, as if they did not have these seats in parliament, they could not influence the European legislate in the way that they currently do. Overall, we can conclude that Eurosceptic politics have had a massive impact on European integration within the United Kingdom. This can be partially attributed to the fact that Eurosceptic parties have managed to pressure the government of the time into delivering a EU referendum , and that following this a Eurosceptic lead Conservative party is now the governing party of the UK which is pursuing a course which is clearly opposed to European integration on issues such as the customs union and immigration. However, the example of the Labour party, which has a large Eurosceptic element within it, should be considered. Before Brexit the party was largely in favour of staying in the European Union, and former Prime Minister Tony Blair had even discussed a referendum on the UK joining the Euro (Carter, 2003). However, as a result of the 2016 referendum Labour has now moved to a more Eurosceptic position, thereby becoming more opposed to European integration.
In conclusion, Euroscepticism is far more nuanced that can be originally expected; thus, it is necessary to use a country by country analysis as Euroscepticism varies widely by both nation and then within each nation’s political parties. Many Eurosceptics seek reform rather than the destruction of the EU, a large part of this reform does involve less European integration but it is often coupled with the notion that there could be re-integration in the future, done in a manner different to how it is now. Whether Eurosceptic politics impacts European integration can also vary country by country, depending on the success of Eurosceptic parties at election. By achieving electoral success, it then increases their chances to impact policy. Often what can also happen is that their policies can be adopted by other parties who attempt to retain popularity or control, such as in the United Kingdom or potentially Germany. There is also an argument that European integration has in fact driven Euroscepticism through the perceived erosion of national cultural identity and sovereignty. Many of the aforementioned parties in this essay such as Lega, AFD and UKIP could be viewed as reactionary, a response to an increasingly connected, and therefore integrated, Europe. Their increase in popularity is only a recent phenomenon. Potentially then, it could be argued that European integration has had a larger impact on Euroscepticism, than the impact Eurosceptic politics has had on European integration as Eurosceptic movements have never before had the power to properly influence the course of European integration in the way that they do now, such as in Italy. Once in power however, we have seen clear examples of where Eurosceptic politics has had an impact on European integration; in Italy where EU rules on refugees and asylum seekers have been ignored, and in the United Kingdom where the Eurosceptic wing of the Conservative party now pushes for a harder Brexit which would completely remove large parts of European integration from the UK.
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